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Turning a Blind Eye to Justice: Kansas Courts 
Must Integrate Scientific Research Regarding 
Eyewitness Testimony into the Courtroom∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a cemetery in Seattle, Washington, there lies a headstone that 
reads: 
Steve G. Titus 
1949–1985 
He fought for his day in court, 
he was used, deceived, betrayed 
and denied justice even in death.1 
 
The justice system betrayed Steve Titus in the spring of 1981 when a 
jury wrongfully convicted him of first degree rape.  The jury, unwarned 
of the potential shortcomings of eyewitness testimony, relied on an 
inaccurate eyewitness identification to convict Titus. 
On October 12, 1980, around 6:45 in the evening, seventeen-year-old 
Nancy Von Roper was kidnapped, driven down a narrow dirt road to a 
pile of rotting wood, assaulted, and raped.2  She said her attacker was 
wearing a three-piece suit and driving a royal blue Chevette with a 
temporary license plate displayed in the back window.3  When Ms. Von 
Roper’s attacker finished with her, he drove back up the muddy road, 
leaving perfectly preserved tire marks.4  After interviewing Ms. Von 
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 1. ELIZABETH J. LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE: THE 
ACCUSED, THE EYEWITNESS, AND THE EXPERT WHO PUTS MEMORY ON TRIAL 60 (1991).  In this 
book, Loftus describes the stories of several wrongfully convicted men, including the story of Steve 
Titus.  She explains his story in detail—how inaccurate eyewitness testimony was responsible for his 
wrongful conviction, how he was exonerated and shortly thereafter passed away, and what is written 
on his headstone in a Seattle cemetery. 
 2. Id. at 34–35. 
 3. Id. at 35. 
 4. Id. 
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Roper and investigating the scene, Detective Ronald Parker took charge 
of the investigation.5  At about 1:20 in the morning, Detective Parker 
noticed a light blue Chevette in a parking lot.6  When Titus and his 
fiancée came out of a restaurant and got into the Chevette, Detective 
Parker followed and stopped them.7 
Soon afterwards, Titus was arrested and charged with rape.  His car 
matched the description Ms. Von Roper had given, and he had a 
temporary license plate sitting in the back window.8  Titus knew he was 
innocent; he had made phone calls from his house at 6:30 and 7:00 that 
evening.9  Since Ms. Von Roper was kidnapped at 6:45,10 there was no 
way he could be guilty.  He insisted that he did not even own a three-
piece suit.11  Titus’s car was scrutinized.  The tire marks in the mud did 
not match his tires.12  His seats were made out of vinyl, not the velveteen 
Ms. Von Roper had described.13  There were no hair fibers, fingerprints, 
or clothes samples that matched Ms. Von Roper.14 
All this evidence in Titus’s favor carried little weight.  His accuser, 
Nancy Von Roper, had selected him from a photomontage and later 
identified him in court as her rapist.15  In the spring of 1981, this 
eyewitness identification persuaded the jury to convict Titus of first 
degree rape in spite of strong evidence of Titus’s innocence.16  Only later 
would the jury learn Titus had been wrongfully accused, wrongfully 
identified, and wrongfully convicted. 
As Steve Titus’s story illustrates, juries tend to rely heavily upon 
eyewitness identification.  In fact, juries tend to give more weight to 
eyewitness identifications than virtually all other forms of evidence.17  
Eyewitness testimony persuades more powerfully than any other 
evidence and has the power to determine the fate of defendants almost 
single-handedly.  Juries must therefore be properly informed on how to 
                                                     
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 36. 
 8. Id. at 35–36. 
 9. Id. at 36. 
 10. Id. at 34. 
 11. Id. at 41. 
 12. Id. at 44. 
 13. Id. at 41. 
 14. Id. at 40–41. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See id. at 43, 47 (stating that his trial began in February 1981 and that he was convicted 
before April 1981). 
 17. Jennifer L. Overbeck, Beyond Admissibility: A Practical Look at the Use of Eyewitness 
Expert Testimony in the Federal Courts, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1895, 1898 (2005). 
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evaluate eyewitness identification.  To better evaluate eyewitness 
identifications, juries need a framework in which to place the 
information they hear at trial.  This framework should be based on 
scientific research about factors that affect the accuracy of eyewitness 
identification. 
Throughout the past century, psychological research has built a 
wealth of evidence demonstrating multiple problems with the accuracy 
of eyewitness identification.18  Within the past several years, over 200 
wrongfully convicted individuals have been exonerated.19  The recent 
exonerations stand as powerful testimony to the problems with 
eyewitness identification.  Eyewitness identification “was the largest 
single factor contributing to the conviction of these innocent people.”20  
Mistaken eyewitness identification contributed to seventy-five percent of 
these wrongful convictions.21  After the exoneration of over 200 
wrongfully convicted individuals, courts throughout the nation have 
slowly begun to take notice of and incorporate evidence regarding 
potential inaccuracy of eyewitness identification.22 
Kansas must do a better job of incorporating this science into the 
courtroom.  In Kansas, expert testimony regarding eyewitness 
identification is inadmissible.23  Kansas judges have the discretion to 
instruct the jury to consider several factors surrounding the eyewitness 
identification in question.24  However, Kansas Pattern Jury Instruction 
(PIK) 52.2025 is incomplete and inaccurate as currently written.  Kansas 
should amend PIK 52.20 to align it with scientific research.  Expert 
testimony regarding how variables like race, other memories, and post-
event information affect the accuracy of eyewitness identification should 
be admissible.  Researchers have termed these variables “own-race bias,” 
“unconscious transference,” and the “feedback factor.”  Own-race bias 
describes the scientifically demonstrated phenomenon which makes it is 
more difficult for a witness to accurately identify someone of a different 
                                                     
 18. Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 277, 
277 (2003). 
 19. Innocence Project Eyewitness Identification Reform, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
Content/165.php (last visited Feb. 11, 2008). 
 20. Wells & Olson, supra note 18, at 277. 
 21. Innocence Project Eyewitness Identification Reform, supra note 19. 
 22. Richard A. Wise & Martin A. Safter, What U.S. Judges Know and Believe About 
Eyewitness Testimony, 18 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 427, 427 (2004) (stating that “[u]ntil 
recently . . . eyewitness research has had relatively little impact on the U.S. criminal justice system). 
 23. See, e.g., State v. Criqui, 77 P.3d 1008 (Kan. 2003) (“expert testimony regarding 
eyewitness identification evidence . . . found to be inadmissible”). 
 24. State v. Gaines, 926 P.2d 641, 649 (Kan. 1996). 
 25. PIK Crim.3d 52.20. 
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race.26  Unconscious transference occurs when a witness unintentionally 
transposes the details of one memory into another memory.27  The 
feedback factor occurs when witnesses subconsciously conform their 
memories of an event to what they hear about the event afterwards.28  
Expert testimony should be admitted when own-race bias, unconscious 
transference, or the feedback factor is relevant to a case.  Most jurors do 
not understand these factors, and these factors can dramatically affect the 
accuracy of eyewitness identification. 
In this Comment, I advocate for change in the current status of 
Kansas law regarding the admissibility of expert witness testimony on 
eyewitness identification accuracy.  In Section II, I will explain the 
different stages in which the brain stores information, and the 
categorization of variables that affect memory accuracy.  I will trace the 
history of research and law regarding eyewitness identification accuracy 
and introduce studies that have been conducted on the four “material” 
phenomena—own-race bias, unconscious transference, after-acquired 
experiences, and the feedback factor.  In Section III, I will explain why 
the Kansas Jury Instructions are insufficient to guard against false 
eyewitness identifications and prevent wrongful convictions.  I will 
provide a more in-depth explanation of relevant studies, and argue that 
appropriate attention to the results of these studies requires changing PIK 
52.20 and allowing courts to admit general, relevant expert witness 
testimony regarding these phenomena. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Eyewitnesses and Memory 
Memory has three important stages: acquisition, retention, and 
retrieval.29  Acquisition is the first stage.  A witness perceives an event, 
and the human mind stores the information in a “memory system.”30  
                                                     
 26. See John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial Identifications, 
28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207, 211 (2001) (describing the phenomenon and stating that “empirical study of 
cross-racial IDs has shown that eyewitnesses have difficulty identifying members of another race”). 
 27. See Francis A. Gilligan et al., The Theory of “Unconscious Transference”: The Latest 
Threat to the Shield Laws Protecting the Privacy of Victims of Sex Offenses, 38 B.C. L. REV. 107, 
108–09 (1996) (describing an example of unconscious transference). 
 28. Jeffrey S. Neuschatz et al., The Mitigating Effects of Suspicion on Post-Identification 
Feedback and on Retrospective Eyewitness Memory, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 231, 232 (2007). 
 29. ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL 10 (3d ed., Lexus Law Publishing 1996) (1987). 
 30. Id. 
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Retention is the stage when the brain stores event information, before 
witnesses attempt to recall the information.31  Retrieval is the final stage, 
when the witness tries to recall the information about an event.32  
Variables that affect different stages of the memory process all carry the 
potential to influence the accuracy of a memory. 
Factors that affect memory accuracy can be separated into two 
categories—system variables and estimator variables.33  System variables 
affect the witness because they can be manipulated before or at trial.34  
For instance, law enforcement and the justice system have some control 
over how law enforcement conducts a lineup, how much witnesses 
discuss among themselves, and questions a prosecutor or defense 
attorney asks the witness.  Estimator variables are not malleable and 
include the witness’s race, how frightened the witness was when the 
alleged crime occurred, and what opportunity the witness had to view the 
suspect during the incident.35 
System and estimator variables have different impacts on a witness’s 
ability to correctly identify the perpetrator.  Thus, research about them 
should play different roles in law enforcement and the judicial system.  
Research on system variables should instigate change in post-event 
interviews, lineups, and suspect questioning to prevent a witness’s 
memory from being tainted by external evidence.  Estimator variables 
affect the reliability of an eyewitness identification, so research on 
estimator variables is valuable in helping a jury determine the accuracy 
of a witness’s testimony. 
B. Eyewitness Identification Research 
1. History of Eyewitness Identification Research 
Skepticism of eyewitness testimony accuracy can be traced back 
thousands of years.  Scholars dating back to ancient Greece questioned 
the accuracy of eyewitness testimony,36 and throughout the centuries, 
                                                     
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Wells & Olson, supra note 18, at 279.  Dr. Gary L. Wells is the leading scholar on memory 
categorization.  He is attributed with the modern categorization of memory into system and estimator 
variables.  Colin G. Tredoux et al., Eyewitness Identification, ENCYCLOPEDIA APPLIED PSYCHOL. 
875, 876 (2004). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 279–80. 
 36. Scott Woller, Rethinking the Role of Expert Testimony Regarding the Reliability of 
Eyewitness Identifications in New York, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 323, 338 (2003) (“Have sight and 
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scholars and scientists have continued to question memory accuracy.  At 
the turn of the twentieth century, Professor Hugo Munsterberg broke new 
ground in the area of eyewitness testimony research.  The majority of 
researchers and scholars view Munsterberg’s work as the “first major 
application of behavioral science methods and theories to eyewitness 
evidence in this country.”37  Munsterberg explained, “‘justice would less 
often miscarry if all who are to weigh evidence were more conscious of 
the treachery of human memory.’”38  Professor Munsterberg sparked 
both controversy and further research when he published the theory that 
fact finders, especially juries, were under-informed to make decisions 
regarding the reliability of eyewitness testimony.39 
Scientists challenged and continued to build on Munsterberg’s 
research, and a select few emerged as well-respected experts in the field 
of memory accuracy.  In 1932, a scientist named Sir Frederick Bartlett 
researched memory by studying British citizens’ memories of Native 
Americans.40  His research revealed that memory is not a videotape, but 
is reconfigured in three ways.41  Memories become shorter and 
abbreviated as time passes, details of memories are lost over time, and 
personal belief about circumstances and culture impact how the mind 
remembers events.42  Reid Hastie, a well-known researcher in the 1980s, 
studied juries and their perspective of eyewitness identifications.  
Hastie’s work indicates that jurors misunderstand many factors that 
affect eyewitness accuracy.43  He concluded that juror misconceptions 
about eyewitness accuracy, combined with potentially inaccurate 
identifications, pose a serious threat to justice.44 
Today, Dr. Elizabeth Loftus is the most recognized expert on 
eyewitness testimony.45  She has participated in many criminal trials 
where eyewitness identification played a major role in the case against 
                                                                                                                       
hearing in them?  Are they not, as the poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses?” (citing 
Robert J. Hallisey, Experts on Eyewitness Testimony in Court—A Short Historical Perspective, 39 
HOW. L.J. 237, 237 (1995) (quoting PLATO, PORTRAIT OF SOCRATES, BEING THE APOLOGY, CRITO, 
AND PHAEDO OF PLATO (R.W. Livingston ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1938)))). 
 37. Hallisey, supra note 36, at 242. 
 38. Id. (citing HUGO MUNSTERBURG, ON THE WITNESS STAND 19 (1923)). 
 39. Id. at 238. 
 40. Matthew J. Sharps et al., Eyewitness Memory in Context: Toward a Systematic 
Understanding of Eyewitness Evidence, 16 FORENSIC EXAMINER 20, 22 (2007). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Hallisey, supra note 36, at 257–58 (citing Vicki L. Smith et al., Eyewitness Accuracy and 
Confidence: Within—Versus Between—Subjects Correlations, 74 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 356 (1989)). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 245. 
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the defendant.46  Research has led Dr. Loftus to conclude that, depending 
on the circumstances, eyewitness identification can be highly unreliable 
and riddled with error.47  Her research also demonstrates that juries hold 
misconceptions about eyewitness testimony.48  She petitions courts to 
admit expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification.49  Following 
in the footsteps of Dr. Loftus and Hastie, researchers continue to 
discover that juries overestimate the accuracy of eyewitness 
identification.50 
Scientists study juries and eyewitness memory in many different 
ways.  They stage crimes, conduct surveys, and perform “prediction” 
studies.51  Scientists staging crimes often expose one group of 
participants to an event and then question them about what happened.52  
Another group of participants, who did not observe the event, are then 
asked to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate answers.53  This 
tests the factors surrounding eyewitness accuracy and the ability of jurors 
to identify accurate testimony.  Researchers performing “prediction” 
studies describe eyewitness identifications to laypersons acting as 
jurors.54  The “jurors” are then asked to determine if the identifications 
were accurate and predict the outcome of the trial.55  In the variety of 
studies, specific variables have consistently emerged that impact 
eyewitness identification accuracy. 
2. Documented Phenomena Affecting Accuracy of Eyewitness 
Identification 
a. Own-Race Bias 
Studies demonstrate that eyewitnesses can more accurately 
distinguish between and identify faces of their own race.56  This 
                                                     
 46. LOFTUS & KETCHAM, supra note 1, at xiii. 
 47. See LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 29, at 1 (“‘creative memory’ of these eyewitnesses is not 
usual”). 
 48. Id. at 6–8. 
 49. See generally id. at 274–98 (discussing the potential benefits to expert testimony regarding 
eyewitness identification). 
 50. Wells & Olson, supra note 18, at 284–85. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 280–81; Rutledge, supra note 26, at 211. 
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phenomenon is called own-race bias.57  Scientists have conducted 
extensive research on own-race bias.58  This research has been conducted 
in many different settings, including laboratory research and real world 
contexts.59  In laboratory research, study subjects view racially diverse 
photographs. 60  Scientists later test to see which faces the subjects can 
correctly identify.61  One famous laboratory study in the 1960s produced 
convincing evidence of own-race bias.62  In the study, conducted by Roy 
S. Malpass and Jerome Kravitz, white participants could identify white 
faces much more easily than black faces.63 
Researchers also study own-race bias by observing real-life 
situations.  One such study, conducted by John C. Brigham, sent 
participants of different races into convenience stores to interact with the 
store clerks.64  Brigham later questioned the convenience store clerks to 
discover which races the clerks could most accurately identify.65  The 
study indicated the clear presence of own-race bias among the clerks 
who attempted to identify a suspect.66  Although much speculation 
surrounds why own-race bias occurs,67 the cumulative studies clearly 
indicate that own-race bias exists and can powerfully impact the 
accuracy of eyewitness identification. 
b. Unconscious Transference 
Unconscious transference is a term coined by Glanville Williams68 
“to refer to the phenomenon in which a person seen in one situation is 
confused with or recalled as a person seen in a second situation.”69  An 
example of unconscious transference is the classic “sailor” case.  A ticket 
                                                     
 57. Rutledge, supra note 26, at 211. 
 58. Wells & Olson, supra note 18, at 280–81. 
 59. Jody E. Frampton, Can a Jury Believe My Eyes, and Should Courts Let Experts Tell Them 
Why Not: The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identification in New 
York After People v. Young, 27 PACE L. REV. 433, 438 (2007). 
 60. LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 29, at 86. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Roy S. Malpass & Jerome Kravitz, Recognition for Faces of Own and Other Race, 13 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 330, 333 (1969). 
 63. LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 29, at 86 (citing Malpass & Kravitz, supra note 62, at 330–
34). 
 64. John C. Brigham et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications in a Field Setting, 42 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 673, 675–76 (1982). 
 65. Id. 
 66. LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 29, at 87–88. 
 67. See discussion infra Part III.A.3. 
 68. Gilligan et al., supra note 27, at 111. 
 69. LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 29, at 89. 
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agent working at a railroad station is robbed, and when called upon to 
identify the robber in a lineup, the ticket agent identifies a sailor.  As it 
turns out, the sailor has a very strong alibi.70  When asked why he 
identified the sailor, the ticket agent said, “His face looked very 
familiar.”71  Unconscious transference occurs when a witness’s memory 
is weak or lacks detail.72  This lack of detail causes gaps that are 
vulnerable to being filled with memories of other events.73  One study 
revealed that “transference subjects—subjects with prior exposure to an 
innocent person”—were three times more likely to incorrectly identify 
the innocent person than the control subjects who had not previously 
seen the innocent person.74  Unconscious transference has been linked to 
both the misidentification of suspects and the wrongful conviction of 
defendants.75 
c. After-Acquired Experiences and the Feedback Factor 
After-acquired experiences and the feedback factor expose an 
eyewitness to information about an incident after the incident has 
occurred.  The feedback factor is one specific type of after-acquired 
experience.  After-acquired experiences can have an impact on memory 
accuracy when they occur during the retention stage in memory (after the 
memory is acquired, and before it is retrieved).76  The information a 
witness is exposed to during this retention stage can inadvertently 
manipulate the witness’s memory of what took place during the incident. 
After-acquired experiences manifest themselves in many different 
circumstances and through different mediums.  Scientists perform fairly 
simple studies to learn the amount of influence after-acquired 
experiences have on memories.  For instance, scientists will show study 
participants a video and then discuss it. 77  When talking about the video, 
the scientists mention details (like barns, roads, etc.) that were not 
                                                     
 70. Id. at 88. 
 71. Id. at 88–89. 
 72. Gilligan et al., supra note 27, at 112. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 110 (citing David J. Ross et al., Unconscious Transference and Lineup Identification: 
Toward a Memory Blending Approach, in ADULT EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CURRENT TRENDS AND 
DEVELOPMENTS 80, 96 (David F. Ross et al. eds., 1994)). 
 75. Id. at 107 (citing Felice J. Levine & June Louin Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal 
Identification: The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1079, 1081 (1973)). 
 76. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 77. LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 29, at 54. 
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actually present.78  Later, when asked about those details, many study 
participants incorrectly remember those details being present in the 
video.79  Likewise, when a witness communicates with counsel, law 
enforcement, or other witnesses about the incident, certain details 
become subconsciously created and concreted in their minds. 
The feedback factor is one type of after-acquired experience and 
occurs when an eyewitness receives feedback regarding a lineup 
identification.  Wells and Bradfield conducted studies in 1998 and 1999 
that demonstrated how post-identification feedback not only increases 
eyewitness’s confidence of their accuracy, but also affects how witnesses 
remember an actual crime or event.80  The researchers played a video for 
participants, asked the participants to identify the perpetrator in the 
video, and gave the participants subtle feedback about the 
identifications.81  People who received positive feedback reported having 
a good view of the crime and being confident about their identification, 
while people with negative feedback reported having a worse view of the 
perpetrator and lower confidence in their identification.82 
C. Admissibility of Expert Eyewitness Identification Research 
1. Responses to Expert Eyewitness Identification Research 
Courts have responded to the research on eyewitness identification in 
varying ways.  Some welcome expert testimony.  Others admit expert 
testimony according to the court’s discretion.  Still others give jury 
instructions.  In the late 1990’s, because of the development of forensic 
DNA testing, the criminal justice system began to take notice of and 
incorporate eyewitness testimony research into the courtroom.83  The 
majority of states admit expert testimony at the trial court’s discretion.84  
Kansas continues to treat expert testimony as per se inadmissible.85  In an 
                                                     
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Neuschatz et al., supra note 28, at 231–32. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Wells & Olson, supra note 18, at 278. 
 84. McMullen v. State, 714 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1998) (“An overwhelming majority of both 
federal and states courts . . . [have adopted a] ‘discretionary view,’ which provides that the 
admission of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification is in the discretion of the trial 
judge.”). 
 85. See, e.g., State v. Reynolds, 639 P.2d 461, 463 (Kan. 1982) (“cautionary instruction, along 
with cross-examination and defense advocacy . . . adequately protect[s] the defendant”). 
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effort to remind the jury to consider certain variables that could affect 
identification accuracy, a group of states have created jury instructions 
patterned after United States v. Telfaire.86  The Telfaire instructions 
encourage the jury to consider factors that might affect the accuracy of 
the eyewitness identification.87  The factors encompass two issues: 1) the 
basic factors surrounding the incident, such as the witness’s opportunity 
to observe, and 2) the circumstances surrounding the identification, such 
as the witness’s certainty and the existence of any inconsistent 
identifications.88  California has built on the foundation of Telfaire, using 
the instructions as a baseline and including additional factors the jury 
should consider.89  Some states only allow cross-examination and do not 
provide jury instructions or expert testimony, reasoning that even jury 
instructions invade the province of the jury and are thus improper.90  
Currently, the federal courts and most state courts place expert witness 
testimony regarding eyewitness identification within the discretion of the 
trial court.91  However, Kansas is not one of these states.  In Kansas, 
expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification is per se 
inadmissible.92 
2. Federal Rules Regarding Expert Testimony 
For many years, the federal courts admitted expert testimony only if 
the science the expert relied on was “sufficiently established to have 
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”93  
This test was commonly known as the Frye general acceptance test.94  
However, the Supreme Court overturned this rule in Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals.95  Daubert held that Frye had been superseded by 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702.96  Rule 702 was subsequently amended in 
                                                     
 86. 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 87. Id. at 558. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 315 (2007) 
(indicating the jury should also consider whether the witness and defendant are of different races). 
 90. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 363 N.E.2d 1230, 1230–31 (Ind. 1977) (“court did not err in 
refusing to give . . . instruction”). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See State v. Reynolds, 639 P.2d 461, 463 (Kan. 1982) (“cautionary instruction, along with 
cross-examination and defense advocacy . . . adequately protect[s] the defendant”). 
 93. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (abrogated by Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993)). 
 94. See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 144 P.3d 684, 693 (Kan. 2006) (applying the Frye test). 
 95. 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993). 
 96. Id. at 587–88. 
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2000 to codify Daubert and its interpretation of the law.97  Rule 702 
currently requires that an expert’s knowledge be scientific, technical, or 
otherwise specialized, that the knowledge assist the trier of fact, and that 
the expert be qualified “by knowledge, skill, experience, training or 
education.”98 
3. The Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Kansas 
a. Expert Testimony in Kansas 
Kansas courts purport to operate on the presumption that “it is 
fundamental to a fair trial that the accused be afforded the opportunity to 
present his or her theory of defense to the charge so the jury may 
properly weigh the evidence and reach its verdict.”99  However, the 
current rules prohibiting expert testimony regarding eyewitness accuracy 
deprive defendants of the opportunity to present important theories of 
defense.  Without expert testimony, jurors cannot understand pertinent 
information regarding eyewitness accuracy. 
i. Statutory Law 
Kansas statutes provide the framework for admitting expert 
testimony.  Section 60-456(b) of the Kansas Statutes requires that expert 
testimony be 1) “based on facts or data perceived by or personally known 
or made known to the witness at the hearing,” and 2) “within the scope 
of the special knowledge, skill, experience, or training possessed by the 
witness.”100  The first requirement is generally interpreted to require that 
the testimony be sufficiently relevant and address the specific facts of the 
case.101  The second requirement is straightforward—the witness must 
have knowledge or special skill and be relying on that knowledge or 
skill.102  Additionally, section 60-457 gives a judge the option to require 
an examination of the data upon which the expert relies.103  The expert 
testimony must be based on “reasonably accurate data,” not just 
                                                     
 97. See, e.g., Camille L. Fletcher, Repressed Memories: Do Triggering Methods Contribute to 
Witness Testimony Reliability?, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 335, 347 n.93 (2003). 
 98. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 99. State v. Humphrey, 845 P.2d 592, 600 (Kan. 1992). 
 100. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-456(b)(1)–(2) (2005). 
 101. Mark D. Hinderks & Steve Leben, On the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Kansas, 66 
J. KAN. B. ASS’N 24, 26 (1997). 
 102. Id. 
 103. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-457 (2005). 
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“unsupported assumption, theoretical speculation, or conclusory 
allegations.”104  In accordance with section 60-456, an expert may give 
testimony as long as that expert does not opine about the credibility of a 
certain witness or evidence.105 
ii.   Case Law 
 
Although the federal courts rejected the Frye test, which allows 
experts to testify only to evidence that is generally accepted in the 
scientific community, Kansas courts continue to subject expert testimony 
to that standard.106  Kansas has adopted a rule of evidence parallel to 
federal rule 702,107 but unlike the federal courts, “subsequent cases in 
Kansas have not addressed the superseding effect of the statutory rules 
enacted in Kansas.”108  Therefore, until Kansas addresses its precedent, 
expert testimony is admissible only if it comports with the Frye test.  
Kansas courts have ruled that expert testimony regarding eyewitness 
identification is inadmissible.  Expert testimony, they assert, is 
unnecessary because defendants can sufficiently critique eyewitness 
identifications through jury instructions and cross-examination.109 
Currently, Kansas law does not allow expert testimony regarding 
eyewitness identification, but it does allow judges to give a jury 
instruction on specific eyewitness identification factors when necessary.  
This current law is the product of recent evolution in Kansas case law.  
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, courts could admit expert testimony 
based on their discretion.110  However, expert testimony could only be 
admitted if it assisted the jury.111  In 1981, the Kansas Supreme Court 
expressed its concern over the potential unreliability of eyewitness 
identification in State v. Warren.112  However, the Warren court decided 
                                                     
 104. Olathe Mfg., Inc. v. Browning Mfg., 915 P.2d 86, 106 (Kan. 1996). 
 105. State v. Smallwood, 955 P.2d 1209, 1214 (Kan. 1998). 
 106. See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 144 P.3d 684, 693 (Kan. 2006) (noting its approval of the Frye 
test). 
 107. See Hinderks & Leben, supra note 101, at 28 (explaining how KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-456(b) 
is parallel to rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
 108. Id. at n.28 (noting that Kansas continues to apply the Frye test, and there is no indication 
that Kansas courts view section 60-456(b) of the Kansas Statutes as having superseded this 
application). 
 109. See, e.g., State v. Willis, 731 P.2d 287, 292 (Kan. 1987).  Although many Kansas cases 
dealing specifically with eyewitness expert testimony do not mention Frye, it is the general rule and 
framework from which they operate. 
 110. State v. Reed, 601 P.2d 1125, 1126 (Kan. 1979). 
 111. Id. at 1127. 
 112. 635 P.2d 1236, 1239–41 (Kan. 1981). 
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that expert testimony was not the “answer to the problem” because 
eyewitness identification shortcomings could be revealed through 
“vigorous” cross-examination and a cautionary jury instruction.113  As a 
result of Warren, PIK 52.20, patterned after Telfaire, was instituted.114  
Later cases interpret Warren to stand for the proposition that eyewitness 
testimony is generally inadmissible in Kansas courts.115  In 1987, the 
defendant in State v. Willis asked the court to expand PIK 52.20 to 
encompass several factors he believed were relevant to his false 
identification.116  Willis requested that the court include jury instructions 
encouraging the jury to consider the phenomena of own-race bias, 
unconscious transference, after-acquired experience, and the feedback 
factor.117  The court rejected the defendant’s request, saying that these 
factors were not self-explanatory, and the jury would need expert 
testimony to understand them.118  The court refused to admit expert 
testimony or expand PIK 52.20 to include the requested factors.119  The 
most recent Kansas case to analyze this issue, State v. Gaines, held that 
PIK 52.20 and cross-examination are sufficient safeguards against 
inaccurate eyewitness identifications.120  The court insisted expert 
testimony regarding eyewitness identification was unnecessary and 
inadmissible at trial.121 
b. Kansas Jury Instructions 
Kansas courts have adopted jury instructions patterned after 
Telfaire.122  According to PIK 52.20, a Kansas judge who doubts the 
accuracy of an eyewitness identification in a case can instruct the jury to 
consider any of the following factors: 1) The opportunity the witness had 
to observe the suspect; 2) the emotional state of the witness at the time of 
the crime; 3) whether the witness had seen the defendant before the 
crime; 4) whether a significant amount of time elapsed between the 
alleged crime and the later identification; 5) whether the witness ever 
                                                     
 113. Id. at 1243. 
 114. State v. Gaines, 926 P.2d 641, 647 (Kan. 1996). 
 115. See, e.g., State v. Reynolds, 639 P.2d 461, 463 (Kan. 1982), Gaines, 926 P.2d at 647. 
 116. 731 P.2d 287, 290–93 (Kan. 1987). 
 117. Id. at 292. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. 926 P.2d at 647. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See PIK Crim.3d 52.20 (listing the factors that the jury may consider when a case involves 
eyewitness identification). 
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failed to identify the defendant or ever made an inconsistent 
identification; 6) the degree of certainty the witness demonstrated when 
the witness identified the suspect; and 7) whether there are any other 
circumstances that may have affected the accuracy of the eyewitness 
identification.123 
Kansas courts should be lauded for taking a step in the early 1980s to 
warn juries about factors that can affect the reliability of an eyewitness 
identification.124  PIK 52.20 was created to protect defendants from 
conviction based on mistaken eyewitness identification.125  However, as 
science has developed, it has revealed areas in which PIK 52.20 is 
incomplete and inaccurate. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Although Kansas courts claim PIK 52.20 is a sufficient safeguard 
against inaccurate eyewitness testimony, PIK 52.20 does not afford a 
defendant the fundamental fairness of presenting “his or her theory of 
defense to the charge so the jury may properly weigh the evidence and 
reach its verdict.”126  Kansas Jury Instruction 52.20 contains errors and is 
incomplete, and Kansas courts should take the following action: 1) 
Factor six, regarding a witness’s confidence, should be removed because 
science has shown little correlation between confidence and accuracy; 2) 
Expert testimony should be admitted on factor two because laypersons 
do not accurately understand the impact of stress on a witness; and 3) 
Expert testimony should be allowed when there is evidence that own-
race bias, unconscious transference, after-acquired experience, or the 
feedback factor has affected an eyewitness identification.  Studies have 
shown these factors impact the accuracy of eyewitness testimony.  A jury 
must be exposed to these factors to be able to justly determine the facts 
of a case.  Expert testimony should only be admitted when an individual 
factor appears to be present in a particular case, and the testimony should 
be restricted to a general explanation of scientific research; experts 
should not be permitted to opine about the credibility of any witness. 
                                                     
 123. Id. 
 124. Kansas Pattern Instruction 52.20 was created and instituted as a result of Warren, a case in 
which the court expressed grave concern over potentially inaccurate identifications.  State v. Warren, 
635 P.2d 1236, 1244 (Kan. 1981).  The Gaines court tracked the history of Kansas Pattern 
Instruction 52.20, attributing the Warren court with its creation.  Gaines, 926 P.2d at 647. 
 125. Id. 
 126. State v. Humphrey, 845 P.2d 592, 595 (Kan. 1992). 
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A.   The Kansas Jury Instructions Are Insufficient to Educate a Jury and 
Enable It to Make an Informed Decision About the Accuracy of 
Eyewitness Identification 
Two factors already present in the jury instruction should be 
amended—factor six should be removed, and factor two should be 
further explained.  Factor six indicates that a jury should consider the 
degree of certainty the witness demonstrated while making the 
eyewitness identification.127  This instruction implies a correlation 
between the witness’s degree of certainty and the accuracy of the 
eyewitness identification.  Surprisingly, scientific studies demonstrate 
there is little correlation between eyewitnesses’ confidence levels and 
identification accuracy.128  Because the jury instruction implies a 
correlation that science has demonstrated does not exist, the court should 
not instruct the jury to consider the eyewitness’s confidence.  Therefore, 
factor six should be removed from PIK 52.20. 
Factor two instructs the jury to consider the emotional state of the 
witness at the time of the crime.129  People generally believe that 
witnesses under stress pay more attention to their circumstances and 
remember faces more accurately.130  However, the exact opposite is 
true.131  Studies have demonstrated that witnesses are less able to 
perceive and remember details of an event when they experience very 
high levels of stress.132  This misconception should be explained to 
juries; otherwise, they will continue to decide cases based on erroneous 
assumptions. 
                                                     
 127. PIK Crim. 3d 52.20. 
 128. See False Identification: New Research Seeks to Inoculate Eyewitnesses Against Errors, 
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, Jan. 3, 1997, http://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp? 
cntn_id=101831 (“An objective question ‘How certain are you that the person you identified is the 
person you saw commit the crime?’ elicits a similar response regardless of whether the eyewitness’ 
memory is accurate or not.”); Neil Brewer, et al., The Confidence-Accuracy Relationship in 
Eyewitness Identification: The Effects of Reflection and Disconfirmation on Correlation and 
Calibration, 8 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. APPLIED 44, 44–45 (2002) (stating, “The outcomes of 
empirical studies, review, and meta-analyses have converged on the conclusion that the confidence-
accuracy relationship for eyewitness identification is weak, with average confidence-accuracy 
correlations generally estimated between little more than 0 and .29.”). 
 129. PIK Crim.3d 52.20. 
 130. LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 29, at 6 (stating it is a common misconception that 
“[w]itnesses remember the details of violent events better than those of nonviolent ones”). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 26–29. 
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1. Because There Is Little Correlation Between a Witness’s Confidence 
and the Accuracy of the Witness’s Testimony, Factor Six of the PIK 
52.20 Should Be Removed 
Factor six of PIK 52.20 instructs the jury to consider “[t]he degree of 
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the time of any identification of 
the accused.”133  Judges generally believe there is a correlation between a 
witness’s confidence and the accuracy of that witness’s testimony,134 so 
it is not surprising judges instruct juries to consider witness confidence 
as a factor.  Research investigating judges’ perspectives on the 
confidence-accuracy correlation revealed that sixty-eight percent of 
judges said they agreed with the statement that “[a]t trial, an eyewitness’s 
confidence is a good predictor of his or her accuracy in identifying the 
defendant as the perpetrator of the crime.”135  Another study showed 
about the same amount of jurors, sixty-two percent, believe there is a 
strong relationship between confidence and accuracy.136  Experts, 
however, have a very different opinion—eyewitness confidence is not a 
good indicator of identification accuracy.  Empirical evidence has 
convinced experts that there is no strong correlation between eyewitness 
accuracy and eyewitness confidence.  In a recent study, seventy-three 
percent of eyewitness testimony researchers reported they would have 
been willing to testify under oath that confidence is not a good indicator 
of eyewitness identification accuracy.137 
The National Science Foundation has begun to support expert 
testimony research, and its research has produced the same results—
eyewitness confidence is not a good indicator of identification accuracy.  
Gary Wells conducted National Science Foundation funded research.  He 
and his colleagues staged crimes in offices and stores and then asked 
witnesses, under varied conditions, to identify the perpetrators.138  Wells 
found the question, “How certain are you that the person you identified is  
 
                                                     
 133. PIK Crim.3d. 52.20. 
 134. Wise & Safter, supra note 22, at 430–32. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Tanja Rapus Benton et al., Eyewitness Memory is Still Not Common Sense: Comparing 
Jurors, Judges, and Law Enforcement to Eyewitness Experts, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 115, 
120 (2006) (showing that only thirty-eight percent of jurors agree with experts that there is little 
confidence-accuracy correlation). 
 137. Brewer et al., supra note 128, at 44. 
 138. False Identification: New Research Seeks to Inoculate Eyewitnesses Against Errors, supra 
note 128. 
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the person you saw commit the crime?” often receives the same answer 
regardless of the accuracy of the eyewitness identification.139 
In another study, Neil Brewer and his colleagues played a video of a 
credit card theft for 944 participants.140  After attempting to identify the 
perpetrator in a photograph lineup, the participants answered a variety of 
questions to indicate how confident they were in their identification.141  
The study revealed, “the [c]onfidence-accuracy correlations were weak 
and did not differ across conditions.”142 
Numerous empirical studies, reviews, and meta-analyses like these 
have been conducted, leading researchers to conclude confidence is not a 
good indicator of identification accuracy.143  A variety of factors can 
skew eyewitness confidence, including the feedback a witness receives 
from law enforcement after making a lineup identification.144  For 
example, researchers know that eyewitnesses’ confidence levels can be 
manipulated by telling witnesses they identified the correct suspect after 
a lineup.145 
Kansas courts should remove factor six from PIK 52.20 because the 
lack of a confidence-accuracy correlation is well-documented.  Factor six 
currently encourages juries to associate witness certainty with witness 
credibility and accuracy.  The court should remove factor six from PIK 
52.20 because research has repeatedly proven that confidence is not a 
good indicator of accuracy. 
2. Expert Testimony Regarding Factor Two of PIK 52.20 Should Be 
Admissible Because Laypersons Do Not Correctly Understand the 
Impact of Stress on an Eyewitness Identification 
Expert testimony should be admitted on factor two of PIK 52.20 
because the impact of stress on eyewitness testimony is counterintuitive.  
Factor two instructs the jury to consider “[t]he emotional state of the 
witness at the time including that which might be caused by the use of a 
weapon or a threat of violence.”146  This factor requires expert 
                                                     
 139. Id. 
 140. Brewer et al., supra note 128, at 47–48. 
 141. Id. at 47–48. 
 142. Id. at 44. 
 143. Id. at 44–45 (mentioning studies performed by Bothwell, Deffenbacher, & Brigham in 
1987, Cutler, Penrod & Martens in 1987, and Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler in 1995). 
 144. See infra Part III.A.3.c (discussing after-acquired experience and the feedback factor). 
 145. False Identification: New Research Seeks to Inoculate Eyewitnesses Against Errors, supra 
note 128. 
 146. PIK Crim.3d. 52.20. 
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explanation because the effects of stress on eyewitness identification are 
not only beyond a jury’s knowledge; they are contrary to general 
opinion.  Most jurors believe that extreme stress causes witnesses to pay 
more attention than usual, enabling them to have detailed memories and 
make more accurate identifications.147  However, thirty years of 
independent studies and meta-analyses have revealed that “high levels of 
stress negatively impact” witnesses’ memories of crime details and 
witnesses’ ability to correctly identify the perpetrator.148 
Although some conflicting research exists,149 the studies and research 
that have accurately simulated real-life crime scenes demonstrate that 
high levels of stress adversely affect memory and identification accuracy.  
Some studies conducted in the mid-1980s showed that when witnesses 
are exposed to high levels of stress, their memory is more accurate than 
those who experience normal stress.150  These studies were conducted 
mostly in laboratories where witnesses were shown pictures depicting 
gruesome or violent scenes.151  The studies did not create any motivation 
for self-preservation, because the witnesses had nothing at stake; they 
were simply analyzing pictures. 
Twenty-two studies in the past several years have imposed real-life 
stress on the eyewitnesses.152  The studies either staged crimes or 
imposed stress by, for example, threatening the eyewitness.153  According 
to a meta-analytic review of this research, the studies consistently 
revealed that “the adverse effect of heightened stress on eyewitness 
memory was statistically reliable.”154  Research that simulated crime 
scene stress on study participants demonstrates that high stress leads to 
less accurate identifications.  Over 450 studies have been conducted 
analyzing different variables on eyewitness identifications,155 and the 
general consensus is clear—high levels of stress adversely affect 
eyewitness identification accuracy.156 
                                                     
 147. LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 29, at 6 (stating a common misconception is that “[w]itnesses 
remember the details of violent events better than those of nonviolent events”). 
 148. Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High Stress on 
Eyewitness Testimony, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 687, 687 (2004). 
 149. See supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text. 
 150. Deffenbacher et al., supra note 148, at 690 (mentioning studies performed by Burke, Heuer 
& Reisberg in 1992, Christianson in 1984, Christianson, Hoffman & Loftus in 1991, and Safer, 
Christianson, Autry, and Osterlund in 1998). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Tactics like staging crimes have been questioned for their ethics. 
 153. Deffenbacher et al., supra note 148, at 697. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 693. 
 156. Id. at 687. 
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It is unjust to instruct the jury to consider the witness’s stress level, 
because juries interpret a high stress level as suggesting accuracy when it 
actually indicates inaccuracy.  The average jury has only common 
knowledge, and common knowledge supports the erroneous conclusion 
that stressful situations heighten witnesses’ ability to remember and 
identify.  Science supports the opposite conclusion.  Because the effects 
of stress on eyewitness memory and identification have proven to be 
counterintuitive, expert testimony regarding this factor should be 
admissible at trial. 
3. Expert Testimony Should Be Admissible on the Issues of Own-Race 
Bias, Unconscious Transference, After-Acquired Experience, and the 
Feedback Factor, Because These Phenomena Are Outside the Realm 
of Common Knowledge 
PIK 52.20 omits several important variables that a jury should 
consider when determining the accuracy of eyewitness identifications—
own-race bias, unconscious transference, after-acquired experience, and 
the feedback factor.  In State v. Willis,157 the defendant petitioned the 
court to allow evidence on these four factors.158  The court rejected the 
defendant’s request, holding that the jury would not understand the 
phenomena if they were simply included in jury instructions; evidence 
like this would require expert testimony.159  Because Kansas courts do 
not allow expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification, the court 
refused to present the jury with any scientific testimony about these 
factors.160 
Years of research have demonstrated these phenomena are legitimate 
and can have powerful effects on eyewitness identification accuracy.  
Because these phenomena are scientific and outside the realm of 
common knowledge, a jury needs expert testimony to understand their 
effect on eyewitness identification accuracy.  Therefore, the jury must be 
exposed to these factors in order to make sufficiently informed decisions. 
                                                     
 157. 731 P.2d 287 (1987). 
 158. Id. at 292. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
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a. Own-Race Bias 
Psychologists are confident that own-race bias affects eyewitness 
identification accuracy.161  The Malpass and Kravitz photograph study in 
the 1960s confirmed that witnesses identify individuals of the same race 
more accurately than they do individuals of different races.162  The white 
subjects in their study from Howard University, for example, were two to 
three times more likely to make a false identification when trying to 
identify a black face as they were when trying to identify a white face.163  
John C. Brigham and his colleagues conducted real-life situational 
research by sending two participants, one black and one white, to a 
convenience store. 164  The two participants interacted with the store clerk 
for several minutes and performed memorable actions like paying for 
cigarettes completely with pennies.165  At first, Brigham returned twenty-
four hours later to ask the clerk to identify the subjects.166  But the clerks 
were only able to correctly identify the participants 7.8% of the time, so 
Brigham began returning with a photographic lineup two hours after the 
participants left.167  After controlling some of the variables, Brigham and 
his colleagues found that white clerks misidentified black participants 
54.8% of the time, while white clerks misidentified white participants 
only 34.9% of the time.168  Empirical evidence has convinced many state 
courts outside of Kansas that it is more difficult to identify members of a 
different race.169 
It is unclear why own-race bias occurs.  Research indicates that own-
race bias is not due to racial prejudice or the ability of individual minds 
                                                     
 161. Saul M. Kassin, On the “General Acceptance” of Eyewitness Testimony Research: A New 
Survey of the Experts, 56 AM. PSYCHOL. 405, 411–12 (2001) (including tables containing the results 
of their research that showed that experts generally agree that cross-race bias affects eyewitness 
testimony). 
 162. Malpass & Kravitz, supra note 62, at 333. 
 163. LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 29, at 86 (citing Malpass & Kravitz, supra note 62, at 330–
34). 
 164. Brigham et al., supra note 64, at 675–76. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 676. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at  678. 
 169. See, e.g., State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 467–68 (N.J. 1999) (“there is an impressive 
consistency in results showing that problems exist with cross-racial eyewitness identification”); 
People v. Palmer, 154 C.A.3d 79, 85–89 (1984); State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 495 (Utah 1986) 
(“given the . . . deep and generally unperceived flaws in [eyewitness testimony] to convict a 
defendant on such evidence without advising the jury of the factors that should be considered in 
evaluating it could well deny the defendant due process of law”). 
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to remember details.170  Some researchers speculate people are more 
likely “to guess at the identity of a criminal in a cross-race identification 
than they are when a same-race identification takes place.”171  Dr. Loftus, 
the leading expert on eyewitness identification and memory, supports the 
theory that the human mind processes images of faces within a race 
differently than faces of different races.172  Other research indicates a 
possible correlation between the amount of interracial contact and the 
ability to identify faces of that race.173  At this time, no hypothesis has 
proven conclusive. 
Regardless of why own-race bias occurs, research has demonstrated 
that this phenomenon has the potential to dramatically affect the 
accuracy of an eyewitness identification.  The jury should be informed 
about own-race bias when making a decision that involves the life and 
future of a defendant.  If a jury is not exposed to the idea of, and science 
behind, own-race bias, it will not be able to accurately weigh the 
testimony it hears. 
Expert testimony is necessary to properly educate and enable the jury 
to make an appropriate decision after weighing all of the facts and 
variables involved.  The jury needs to be informed of own-race bias.  
This could be accomplished through jury instructions or expert 
testimony, but expert testimony is a more favorable option.  A jury 
instruction is not a sufficient means to explain own-race bias; jury 
instructions are too broad and open-ended.  Unless a jury knows the 
research behind own-race bias, it will not understand that own-race bias 
is a proven phenomenon.  Without knowing it is a proven phenomenon, a 
jury will not understand how to apply a jury instruction to consider 
“race” to the case in question.  Because this information is important, and 
a jury instruction is insufficient to educate the jury, expert testimony on 
own-race bias should be admissible. 
b. Unconscious Transference 
Unconscious transference is a subclass of the broader idea of 
transference seen in psychology.  Psychologists often observe emotional 
transference when anger towards one person is passed onto another 
                                                     
 170. LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 29, at 87–88. 
 171. Id. at 88. 
 172. Id. 
 173. But see Frampton, supra note 59, at 438 n.29 (discussing a case that produced evidence that 
this hypothesis may not be correct). 
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unrelated and faultless person.174  Unconscious transference affects the 
accuracy of eyewitness identification when witnesses transfer certain 
details from one memory into another memory. 175  This occurs when 
specific details of the memory are weak or fuzzy. 176  Gaps in the 
memory may occur if, in the acquisition stage, it is difficult for the 
eyewitness to perceive details.  This is especially true during crimes that 
induce high stress.  The high stress levels cause victims to narrow their 
focus on, for example, a weapon, opening a safe, or planning a route of 
escape.177 
A long retention phase may also cause gaps in memory.  During a 
long retention stage, a memory can “decay,” leaving opportunity for 
familiar details to replace the original details.178  Unconscious 
transference of memory applies only to situations where the details 
filling in the gaps occur in a similar context or event.179  For instance, 
unconscious transference can occur if the accused and the real 
perpetrator look somewhat alike, and the witness has seen both of them 
come through her checkout line. 
Although some information regarding unconscious transference can 
probably be elicited through cross-examining a witness, the jury will not 
have a context in which to analyze any cross-examination unless expert 
testimony is admitted.  The cross-examining attorney may ask about past 
events,180 and the attorney may even be able to imply that the witness is 
confusing two people who look familiar.  However, most jury members 
do not understand how gaps in memory are filled with details from other 
memories.  In the face of an eyewitness identification, cross-examination 
attempting to elicit evidence of unconscious transference, or implying 
that unconscious transference might have occurred, will not be very 
persuasive.  Therefore, a jury needs to understand the basic theory of 
unconscious transference in order to accurately interpret the cross-
examination and evidence the defense presents. 
                                                     
 174. Gilligan et al., supra note 27, at 115–16. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 112. 
 177. Id. at 113. 
 178. Id. at 112. 
 179. Id. at 114. 
 180. In many sex cases, the cross-examining attorney cannot ask about past sexual experiences 
of the victim because victims are statutorily protected.  See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 177 P.3d 419, 423 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (limiting admissibility of evidence regarding victim’s prior sexual 
experiences). 
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c. After-Acquired Experience and the Feedback Factor 
i. After-Acquired Experiences 
After-acquired experiences occur in many ways.  For instance, if an 
eyewitness to an accident later hears on television that the driver was 
drunk, she may superimpose visions of reckless driving on her memory, 
even though she did not perceive that at the scene.181  In one study of 
after-acquired experiences, subjects viewed a video in which there was 
no barn.  Half of the subjects were asked, “How fast was the sports car 
going when it passed the barn?”  More than seventeen percent of 
participants later remembered a barn in the video.182  Studies like this 
reveal that memory is malleable and vulnerable to certain stimuli during 
the retention stage. 
ii. Feedback Factor 
Many after-acquired experiences are difficult to control.  It is 
unrealistic to assume a witness will go into isolation after an event and 
not watch television or discuss the event with other witnesses.  However, 
the feedback that comes from communications with law enforcement is 
easier to control and, because it affects witness memory, it should be 
controlled. 
Studies conducted in 1998 and 1999 by Wells and Bradfield revealed 
that post-identification feedback not only increases eyewitness’s 
confidence of their accuracy, but also affects how the witnesses 
remember the actual crime or event.183  Study subjects watched a security 
camera video of a crime and attempted to identify the perpetrator in a 
photograph lineup.184  The real perpetrator’s photograph was not in the 
lineup, so all the identifications were mistaken.185  After each witness 
made an identification, the administering officer gave three kinds of 
feedback—”You got him,” “Sorry, it was another guy,” or no feedback at 
all.186  When the eyewitnesses were later asked about their opportunity to 
observe the incident, those who received positive feedback recalled 
having a better view, having paid more attention, remembering the scene 
                                                     
 181. LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 29, at 54. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Neuschatz et al., supra note 28, at 232. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
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very well, and having made their identifications easily.187  The 
eyewitnesses who received disconfirming feedback reported having had 
a worse opportunity to view the crime scene, having paid less attention, 
and having had a more difficult time making the identification.188  Wells 
and Bradfield hypothesize that because eyewitnesses do not think about 
how good their view of the perpetrator is at the time of the event, they 
rely on post-event factors to determine this.189  Therefore, if good 
feedback is given after the lineup identification, witnesses will testify at 
trial that they are very confident the defendant is the perpetrator. 
iii. Expert Testimony Is Necessary Because Safeguards Cannot 
Completely Protect Witnesses from After-Acquired Experiences and 
Feedback 
Post-identification experiences, including feedback, affect witnesses’ 
memories and confidence levels, and juries need expert testimony to 
understand the mechanics of memory.  Expert testimony on the feedback 
factor should only be admitted if there is reason to believe the eyewitness 
received feedback during or after the identification. 
Some scholars and individuals in law enforcement argue against the 
admission of expert testimony on this issue, admitting the effects that 
post-event information has on memory, but calling for changes in the law 
enforcement process instead of admission of expert testimony.190  
Although after-acquired experiences are system variables and can be 
somewhat controlled, the system is not perfectly controlled, nor will it 
ever be.  Witnesses will continue to discuss cases among themselves 
before litigation begins.  They will watch television and listen to radio 
reports, exposing themselves to after-acquired experiences.  Safeguards 
should be implemented to decrease feedback from law enforcement 
during lineups and identifications.  However, the presence of safeguards 
does not ensure that law enforcement personnel will always abide by 
those safeguards.  Law enforcement, scholars, and members of the 
judiciary must take steps to protect witnesses from post-event feedback.  
Until sufficient safeguards are implemented and, afterwards, when the 
safeguards fail to protect witness memory, witnesses will continue to 
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have after-acquired experiences and receive feedback.  When 
circumstances indicate an eyewitness has received after-acquired 
experiences like the feedback factor, the court should admit expert 
testimony to educate the jury on the scientifically demonstrated effects of 
these phenomena. 
B. Cross-Examination Does Not Sufficiently Guard Against Inaccurate 
Eyewitness Identification, Because Juries Need Expert Testimony to 
Understand How Material Phenomena Affect Eyewitness Testimony 
1.  Expert Testimony Does Not Invade the Province of the Jury 
One of the most common reasons judges give for excluding expert 
testimony on the potential inaccuracy of eyewitness identification is that 
such expert testimony invades the province of the jury.191  Judges and 
prosecutors often claim that expert testimony regarding the inaccuracy of 
eyewitness identification does not assist the jury because it is common 
sense that a witness’s testimony could be inaccurate.192  However, 
decades of research indicates that common knowledge is limited 
regarding memory malleability and its potential inaccuracy.193  Studies 
reveal that there is a vast difference between what jurors believe about 
eyewitness memory and what experts have concluded based on 
research.194  Surveys and studies demonstrate little correlation (less than 
fifty percent) between the opinions of lay persons and the opinions of 
experts regarding variables that affect the accuracy of eyewitness 
testimony.195  In a study conducted by Professor Tanja Rapus Benton of 
the University of Tennessee, jurors disagreed with experts on eighty-
seven percent of issues regarding factors that affect eyewitness 
accuracy.196  Professor Rapus Benton surveyed 205 participants, 
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including jurors, judges, and law enforcement.197  He compared their 
answers to answers provided by experts.198  The survey indicated that 
ninety percent of experts believed that own-race bias affected eyewitness 
identification, while only forty-seven percent of jurors thought so.199  
Eighty-seven percent of experts agreed there is no strong correlation 
between accuracy and confidence; only thirty-eight percent of jurors 
thought so.200  Eighty-one percent of experts reported that unconscious 
transference affects eyewitness memory and identification, yet only 
thirty percent of jurors thought so.201 
In past years, Kansas courts have excluded expert testimony on 
eyewitness identification on the basis that such testimony invades the 
province of the jury.  Although this argument was presented in early 
Kansas cases202 and throughout the United States,203 Willis, a more recent 
Kansas Supreme Court case, does not support this reasoning.  In Willis, 
the court examined issues like the feedback factor, own-race bias, 
unconscious transference, and after-acquired experience.204  It concluded 
that testimony on these factors would not invade the province of the 
jury.205  In fact, the court refused to give a jury instruction on any of the 
material phenomena because it concluded they were outside the province 
of the jury and would have required expert explanation.206  Without 
expert testimony, the court said, the jury would not understand, or know 
how to apply, the factors.207  Since Willis, science on the feedback factor, 
own-race bias, unconscious transference, and after-acquired experience 
has developed and continues to indicate that these factors influence 
memory accuracy.  As Willis explained, these issues are too complicated 
for the jury alone to make sense of them.  The phenomena are outside 
common knowledge and the province of the jury.  Expert testimony does 
not invade the province of the jury and should be admissible in the 
interest of justice. 
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2. Because Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Identification 
Does Not Invade the Province of the Jury, Cross-Examination Is Not 
Sufficient to Expose Weaknesses in Eyewitness Testimony 
A jury will not understand the information elicited in cross-
examination without a framework within which to process that 
information.  Laypersons would not understand the meaning of own-race 
bias or unconscious transference without expert testimony, as Willis 
explained.  If the jury does not understand the phenomena these terms 
represent, it will not understand how the information elicited from cross-
examination affects the accuracy of eyewitness testimony.  For example, 
a cross-examining attorney may ask an eyewitness, “But you are 
Caucasian, and the defendant is African-American, correct?”  Without 
understanding own-race bias, the jury will not naturally associate racial 
differences with a weakened ability to make an accurate identification.  
The attorney may even ask a follow-up question: “Isn’t it harder for you 
to distinguish between the faces of African-Americans than it is for you 
to distinguish between the faces of Caucasians like yourself?”  
Regardless of the witness’s answer, the jury does not know the answer to 
this question—the jury has no framework with which to view the cross-
examination.  The jury does not know whether it is generally more 
difficult for individuals of one race to identify individuals of another 
race.  Expert testimony gives a jury a framework through which it can 
sort and understand information elicited in cross-examination.  Without 
such a framework, cross-examination cannot demonstrate weaknesses in 
eyewitness identification because the cross-examining attorney will be 
attempting to demonstrate the presence of a phenomena the jury does not 
even know exists. 
Logically, the idea that cross-examination is sufficient to reveal 
inaccurate identifications must follow the assumption that the jury 
already has everything it needs to judge the accuracy and credibility of a 
witness.  So, if expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification 
invades the province of the jury—if it is all common sense—then cross-
examination should be able to present the jury with all of the information 
required to make an educated decision.  However, according to Willis, 
juries do not naturally know about factors like own-race bias, 
unconscious transference, and after-acquired experience; these factors 
require expert explanation.208  Therefore, these factors do not interfere 
with the province of the jury, because they are not common sense.  
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Research indicates that cross-examination may not be as effective as 
some courts believe, and because the material phenomena are generally 
unknown or misunderstood, “ordinary cross-examination will never elicit 
facts from which the jury can infer the impairment.”209 
Furthermore, research has demonstrated that cross-examination, in 
the face of a confident eyewitness, is not very effective.  A National 
Science Foundation study revealed that if the eyewitness believes what 
she is saying, cross-examination often fails to present an accurate 
recollection of the event.210  Because eyewitness identifications are such 
powerful pieces of evidence, cross-examination will often seem like 
grasping for straws in a defensive manner.  Offering expert testimony, on 
the other hand, would enable a defendant to present information in an 
offensive manner. 
C. Expert Testimony Regarding the Accuracy of Eyewitness 
Identification Should Be Admitted Because It Is Based on Science 
That Is Generally Accepted in the Community 
The Frye test establishes that an expert can only testify to science 
that is generally accepted in the scientific community in which it was 
conducted.211  Although the federal courts have rejected Frye because it 
disallows potentially important novel science,212 Kansas continues to 
apply the Frye test.213  Therefore, in Kansas, experts can only testify to 
science that meets the “general acceptance” test.214  Some members of 
the legal community accuse eyewitness research of being junk science.  
Some critique the studies that create a controlled environment and isolate 
variables in order to analyze them.215  These critics argue that isolated 
variables in a controlled environment cannot parallel real-life 
circumstances, and thus the results of these studies should not be applied 
to real-life scenarios.216  Others involved in the legal community criticize 
field studies and crime simulations, saying this research lacks a 
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controlled environment in which some variables can be held constant 
while others are studied.217 
Matthew J. Sharps, a psychologist, was a critic of eyewitness 
identification research for all of the reasons explained above.  He and his 
colleagues set out to conduct a study with research that would be both 
contextually valid and controlled.  They studied 149 women and 49 
men.218  They exposed these research subjects to a controlled crime scene 
for ten to twenty minutes.219  Sharps and his colleagues then asked the 
subjects a series of questions about the “criminal” and the crime scene.220  
They then asked the subjects to identify the “criminal” from a lineup.221  
Seventy percent of the subjects were able to accurately describe the 
“criminal,” but only a shocking ten percent were able to correctly 
identify him in a lineup.222 
Sharp’s study is an important, recent study that reflects the possible 
inaccuracy of eyewitness identification, but it is not the only study that 
should be considered.  The hundreds of studies performed over the past 
century about eyewitness identification provide an in-depth look at the 
issue of eyewitness identification accuracy.  They are significant and 
persuasive, and have even gained acceptance, endorsement, and funding 
from the National Science Foundation.223  The cumulative results of 
these studies demonstrate that both estimator and system variables 
influence memory accuracy.  These results are generally accepted among 
researchers and the psychology community at large.  The science meets 
the Frye standards and indicates expert testimony regarding eyewitness 
identification should be admissible in certain cases.  A jury still need not 
believe an expert or believe in the science the expert offers, but that is an 
issue of credibility, not admissibility.  Because eyewitness identification 
research is commonly accepted throughout the psychology field in which 
it is performed, it meets the Frye test.  Therefore, courts should admit 
expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification reliability when the 
expert testimony is relevant to a particular case. 
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D. Standards for Expert Testimony 
1. Experts Should Be Allowed to Testify, in a General Manner, to 
Factors That Are Relevant to the Case 
Because experts may not offer opinions about the reliability of a 
specific witness,224 courts should only permit expert witnesses to testify 
generally about scientific research, not to opine about whether a specific 
identification is accurate.  In order to meet relevancy requirements,225 
Kansas courts should only admit expert testimony on factors pertinent to 
a specific case.  For example, if the crime was non-violent and the 
witness was not emotionally involved, the expert should not be allowed 
to testify on the effects of high level stress on the reliability of 
eyewitness identification. 
Because Kansas statutes require that all evidence be relevant,226 but 
do not allow experts to opine about the credibility of witnesses, experts 
should be allowed to educate the jury by discussing the results of 
research on the accuracy of eyewitness testimony.  A recent Kansas case 
reflects this balance between generality and relevance in expert 
testimony.227 
In State v. Criqui, the court held that an expert can testify generally 
on relevant topics.228  In Criqui, the defendant wanted to admit expert 
testimony that included: 1) The proper and improper techniques for 
interviewing a child involved in a sexual abuse case; 2) How certain 
procedures and techniques could adversely affect the reliability and 
accuracy of the witness’s statements; 3) The problems that the expert 
witness perceived with the interviewing techniques that were used in the 
case; 4) How those problems affected the reliability and accuracy of the 
witness’s statements; and 5) That the witness’s statements needed to be 
viewed with caution.229 
The trial court excluded all of the testimony.230  The Kansas Court of 
Appeals found the trial court did not err in excluding the following: 1) 
                                                     
 224. State v. Humphrey, 36 P.3d 844, 851 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001). 
 225. Section 60-456(b)(1) of the Kansas Statutes requires an expert opinion to be “based on facts 
or data perceived by or personally made known to the witness at the hearing.” 
 226. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-445 (“[T]he judge may . . . exclude evidence if . . . its probative 
value is significantly outweighed by the risk that [it will] unfairly or harmfully surprise [the other] 
party.”). 
 227. State v. Criqui, No. 88388, 2003 WL 22119226, at *4 (Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2003). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Criqui, 2003 WL 22119226, at *4. 
 230. Id. at *5. 
06 - SHELTON FINAL 8/24/2008  12:25:36 PM 
978 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
problems the expert found with the interviewing techniques in the case; 
and 2) how the interview techniques directly affected the reliability of 
the witness’s testimony.231  However, the court of appeals found the trial 
court erred in excluding expert testimony on the general proper and 
improper interviewing techniques and explained how, generally, certain 
factors could adversely affect the reliability and accuracy of the 
testimony.232 
Similarly, expert testimony about the general factors surrounding an 
eyewitness identification should be admissible.  However, the court 
should not permit an expert to speak directly to how factors in the case at 
hand affected or might have affected a specific witness’s testimony.  The 
court should permit an expert to explain the phenomena of own-race 
bias, unconscious transference, and the feedback factor, and how each 
phenomenon can affect eyewitness identification accuracy.  In keeping 
with the relevance requirements, for instance, if the witness and suspect 
are of the same race, no testimony about own-race bias should be 
admitted; furthermore, unless there is evidence of unconscious 
transference, no testimony about unconscious transference should be 
admitted. 
2. To Protect the System from Abuse, Courts Should Require 
Defendants to Produce Credible Evidence of a Phenomenon in the 
Case Before an Expert Can Testify 
Although several hundred people have been exonerated in recent 
years, law enforcement and prosecutors have obtained thousands of 
presumably rightful convictions.  Many of those convictions undoubtedly 
involved accurate eyewitness identifications.  Even the studies discussed 
in this Comment include a percentage of accurate eyewitness 
identifications.  This critique of eyewitness identification accuracy does 
not ignore the diligent work by law enforcement to utilize accurate 
eyewitness testimony in rightfully convicting guilty defendants.  Once 
Kansas courts afford the opportunity to defendants to present expert 
testimony, the system will be vulnerable to abuse.  Therefore, safeguards 
must be implemented to protect the law enforcement process. 
Because of the danger of abuse, courts should require defendants to 
meet a high threshold of relevancy before allowing expert testimony on a 
specific phenomenon.  For instance, the defendant must be able to 
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produce strong evidence of a witness’s after-acquired experience or 
unconscious transference before an expert would be allowed to testify.  
Mere speculation, without support, that a phenomenon occurred and 
affected eyewitness testimony should not be sufficient.  The exact 
showing a defendant must make would serve as ample material for a 
separate comment.  This Comment simply states that the standard should 
be reasonably high to protect the system from abuse.  It should also be 
acknowledged that requiring the defendant to meet a reasonably high 
standard will require extra time and has the potential to extend the length 
of trials.  However, in the ever-enduring struggle to protect the innocent 
and convict the guilty, a consideration of time should not stand as an 
obstacle to the pursuit of justice. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Steve Titus, a young man in the prime of his life, was robbed of his 
reputation, fiancée, freedom, and innocence when he was unjustly 
condemned to prison for a first-degree rape he did not commit.  He 
served another man’s sentence.  In May 1981, after the true perpetrator 
of the crime was found, all charges were dropped against Steve Titus, 
and he was released to regain his life.233  However, he never regained his 
life—his reputation was forever tainted, his fiancée was gone, and his 
innocence was robbed throughout his time in prison.234  Steve Titus went 
on to sue the state for his wrongful conviction, but he never saw 
justice.235  At thirty-five, eleven days before he was to meet the Port of 
Seattle in court, Steve Titus died of a heart attack.236 
Sadly, Steve Titus is joined by hundreds of other innocent people 
undeservedly condemned to prison for crimes they did not commit.  
“Compared to how many people are rightly convicted,” someone told 
me, “it really is a small number of people who are wrongly convicted.”  
But justice in the United States demands that “‘it is better for ten guilty 
people to be set free than for one innocent man to be unjustly 
imprisoned.’”237 
PIK 52.20 is an incomplete response to the problem of inaccurate 
eyewitness testimony.  Factor six, regarding witness confidence, should 
be removed, because science has shown that witness confidence is a poor 
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indicator of accuracy.  Expert testimony regarding how heightened stress 
has a counterintuitive affect on eyewitness memory should be 
admissible.  Expert testimony should be admissible in Kansas on the 
well-documented factors of own-race bias, unconscious transference, 
after-acquired experience, and the feedback factor because these 
phenomena carry great potential to manipulate eyewitness identification 
accuracy.  The court should only admit expert testimony on these factors 
when there is evidence they are relevant to a particular case.  
Furthermore, the court should permit experts to testify generally to how 
the phenomena can affect the accuracy of eyewitness identifications; the 
court should not allow an expert to opine on a specific witness’s 
credibility.  This can be accomplished by statute or by the Kansas 
Supreme Court’s acknowledgment of science and overturning of 
precedent.  The mechanics of how this is accomplished are not 
important, but a change in Kansas law is necessary. 
 
